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OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Anthony Sides brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against various prison officials at SCI Greene, a correctional
facility in Pennsylvania, alleging violations of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The case proceeded to trial in
      The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, where the jury reached a verdict in favor of the
defendants.  Sides appeals that decision, contending that he was
denied a fair trial because the District Court required that he be
restrained by handcuffs and leg irons throughout the trial.
Though we have concerns regarding the manner in which the
Court handled this issue, any error here was nonetheless
harmless.  Thus we affirm.1
I. Background
In his Complaint, Sides, a former inmate at SCI Greene,
alleged that Officer James Cherry entered his cell and attacked
him in April 2002.  Sides further alleged that other prison
officials denied his repeated requests for medical care.  The case
proceeded to trial in January 2008.      
A. The District Court’s Imposition of Physical
Restraints
Following jury selection, the District Court held an
informal conference in chambers and raised the possibility that
Sides would be physically restrained—i.e., appear in leg irons
and handcuffs—during trial.  Sides’ counsel objected to the
imposition of any physical restraints, and argued—citing
4precedent from another circuit court—that the District Court
should employ a “balancing test” to determine whether physical
restraints were warranted “in terms of [the] interest of the
plaintiff and the need[] to have him in handcuffs.”  Counsel also
urged the Court not “just . . . [to] defer to any type of
Department of Corrections policies” on the issue.  
In response, defendants’ counsel noted that he did not
represent the Department of Corrections, and thus could not
“really give . . . guidance” to the Court on the issue.  When the
Judge asked whether counsel would “make some calls to see if
somebody could come up and represent” the Department of
Corrections, counsel responded that Sides was considered “very
high risk,” had “been a very assaultive inmate[,] and [was]
currently in a special needs unit” at SCI Greene.  Though
defendants’ counsel stated that he would be willing to “proffer
testimony” on the issue, he argued that, in light of “Sides’ track
record of . . . misconduct[] and violence,” it would be
appropriate to have him “handcuffed and shackled and certainly
[placed] under guard.”
The Judge then informed the parties that he had spoken
with a United States Deputy Marshal that morning regarding the
issue:
I was told by [the] Deputy Marshal . . . [,] who is
in charge of security for the Courts, that Mr. Sides
is a category five security risk[,] which is the
5highest category of security risk the Department
of Justice has or Department of Corrections has.
That he is in a special needs unit at the prison.
That if ordered, I could have the shackles
removed; however, he recommended against it.
I asked him what could be done to
minimize this and he ha[s] agreed to place some
type of a curtain at the desk so that the shackles
would not be obvious throughout the trial.
We’ve agreed that when he is called to
testify, we will take him—we’ll take the jury out
of the room, put him in the witness box.  I mean,
the guards will take the shackles off.  The marshal
will put extra people in the courtroom while he
testifies.
Accepting the Court’s ruling, Sides’ counsel raised the
additional concern that, if corrections officers sat directly behind
Sides during trial, “anything he want[ed] to discuss with
[counsel] ha[d] the potential of being heard by” the officers.
The Court acknowledged that “this is an obvious prejudicial
issue,” but “suggest[ed] [that they] whisper.” 
The District Judge put in place preventive measures
during trial to mitigate the prejudice to Sides of appearing in
shackles.  Those measures were: a jacket be placed over Sides’
6hands and wrists to hide the handcuffs while he sat at the
plaintiff’s table; a paper apron be wrapped around the plaintiff’s
table to obscure Sides’ leg irons; and Sides would not testify
wearing either the handcuffs or leg irons.  Because the apron did
not reach the bottom of the floor, boxes were placed underneath
the table to obscure completely the leg irons (though no similar
measures were taken with respect to the defendants’ table).  In
addition, the Judge addressed the fact that Sides would be
physically restrained during trial in his preliminary instructions
to the jury.
B. The Trial
Despite the measures the Judge called for, Sides’
handcuffs were not always obscured.  When Sides stood up as
the Judge entered or left the courtroom, the jacket shifted off his
hands, exposing the handcuffs.  The jacket also shifted off
Sides’ hands whenever he raised them to write a note to his
lawyer or take a drink of water.  On each such occasion, Sides’
trial counsel readjusted the jacket to conceal the handcuffs.  In
addition, two uniformed correctional officers sat approximately
five feet directly behind Sides throughout the trial. 
Before Sides took the witness stand to testify, the jury
was taken out of the courtroom.  Contrary to the District Court’s
order, however, Sides—for reasons not apparent from the
record, and despite the reminder of Sides’ counsel to the Court
of its prior instruction (Trial Tr. 4–5, Jan. 29, 2008)—testified
7while wearing handcuffs and leg irons.  When he motioned with
his hands during his testimony, the jacket covering his handcuffs
shifted and the handcuffs became visible.  
Sides testified as follows.  He and Officer Cherry got into
an argument on the morning of April 20, 2002.  Cherry became
increasingly agitated, and ultimately instructed Officer Brown
to unlock Sides’ cell.  Cherry entered Sides’ cell and began
striking Sides with his fists.  Immediately after the attack, Sides
requested medical attention from Officers Rush and Brown, who
denied his requests.  According to Sides, Officer Juliani also
denied medical attention to Sides when he requested it later that
day.  Sides claimed he did not receive medical attention until
nearly a month later, when a prison physician’s assistant
examined him.  He testified as well that he still suffers neck pain
from the attack. 
The officers also testified at trial.  Officer Cherry stated
that Sides was agitated and threatening the morning of April 20,
but denied he had entered Sides’ cell or attacked him.  Officers
Rush, Brown, and Juliani also disavowed any knowledge of the
incident, and denied that Sides had ever requested medical
treatment.  
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Sides filed a motion for a new trial, which the District Court
summarily denied.  He timely appeals to us.
8II. Discussion
A. Physical Restraints and the Right to a Fair Trial
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Supreme
Court recognized that requiring a criminal defendant to appear
in shackles before a jury may result in an unfair trial.  As the
Allen Court explained, “[n]ot only is it possible that the sight of
shackles . . . might have a significant effect on the jury’s
feelings about the defendant, but the use of th[e] technique is
itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of
judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”  Id. at
344.  Because shackling a defendant during trial is an
“inherently prejudicial practice,” it “should be permitted only
where justified by an essential state interest specific to each
trial.”  Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1986); see
also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (noting that the
appearance of a criminal defendant in shackles “almost
inevitably affects adversely the jury’s perception of the character
of the defendant”). 
Several of our sister circuit courts have reasoned that the
concerns expressed in Allen also apply in the context of civil
trials.  See Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“[T]he concerns expressed in Allen are applicable to parties in
civil suits as well.”); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir.
1993) (“[T]he principles from Allen . . . extend[] to include not
just criminal defendants, but inmates bringing civil actions and
9inmate-witnesses as well.”); Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d
529, 530 (8th Cir. 1992) (“In [prisoner civil rights] cases, the
district court has a responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are
made to permit the inmate and the inmate’s witnesses to appear
without shackles during proceedings before the jury.”); Tyars v.
Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284–85 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing
Allen and reasoning that “[t]he likelihood of prejudice inherent
in exhibiting the subject of a civil commitment hearing to the
jury while bound in physical restraints . . . is simply too great to
be countenanced without at least some prior showing of
necessity”).  
We agree with these courts, as “fairness in a jury trial,
whether criminal or civil in nature, is a vital constitutional
right.”  Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.
1988); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)
(“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Thus, we join them, and hold that
requiring a party in a civil trial to appear in shackles “may well
deprive him of due process unless the restraints are necessary.”
Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1122.  We reject the officers’ argument
that, because prisoner-plaintiffs have no absolute constitutional
right to be present during a civil trial, they necessarily do not
have a right to appear at such a trial without physical restraints.
See Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993).
B. Abuse of Discretion
      We deal in this case solely with the decision to shackle a2
prisoner-plaintiff in a civil trial.  Though we believe the
procedures we adopt are generally consistent with those
applicable in the criminal context, the decision to shackle a
criminal defendant during trial involves even weightier due
process concerns, and a well-developed body of precedent
applies in that context.  See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432
F.3d 1189, 1241–46 (3d Cir. 2005).
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We also follow our sister circuits in reviewing for abuse
of discretion a district court’s decision to restrain an inmate
physically during a civil trial.   See Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1124;2
Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358.  “The principles consistently applied
are that the trial court has discretion to order physical restraints
on a party or witness when the court has found those restraints
to be necessary to maintain safety or security[.]”  Davidson, 44
F.3d at 1122–23.  Thus, district courts should balance the
prejudice to the prisoner-plaintiff against the need to maintain
safety or security.  Woods, 5 F.3d at 247; see also Davidson, 44
F.3d at 1125 (district courts have a “responsibility to determine
whether [a prisoner-plaintiff’s] due process right not to appear
before the jury in shackles . . . [is] outweighed by considerations
of security”).  When a district court determines that restraints are
necessary, it should “impose no greater restraints than are
necessary, and [] must take steps to minimize the prejudice
resulting from the presence of the restraints.”  Davidson, 44
F.3d at 1123; see also Holloway, 957 F.2d at 530 (when physical
restraints are necessary, a district court “should take appropriate
      We stress that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only3
where genuine and material factual disputes exist as to the
danger posed by a prisoner-plaintiff.  We caution, however, that
an evidentiary hearing on the shackling question is not an
appropriate forum in which to re-litigate the events underlying
a prisoner-plaintiff’s prior convictions or disciplinary infractions
while in prison.
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action to minimize the use of shackles, to cover shackles from
the jury’s view, and to mitigate any potential prejudice through
cautionary instructions”).     
What process should trial courts use to seek the proper
balancing of interests?  At the least, they should hold a
proceeding outside the presence of the jury to address the issue
with counsel.  However, where there are genuine and material
factual disputes regarding the threat to courtroom security posed
by a prisoner-plaintiff, an evidentiary hearing is called for.   See3
Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1125 (district court abused its discretion in
refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing as to disputed allegations
that the prisoner-plaintiff was a flight risk); see also Lemons,
985 F.2d at 358.
In determining whether an inmate should be physically
restrained during trial, district courts may rely on a variety of
sources, including (but not limited to) records bearing on the
inmate’s “proclivity toward disruptive and/or violent conduct”
(such as the inmate’s criminal history and prison disciplinary
12
record), and the opinions of “correctional and/or law
enforcement officers and the federal marshals.”  Woods, 5 F.3d
at 248.  Indeed, though a district court may rely “heavily” on
advice from court security officers, it “bears the ultimate
responsibility” of determining what restraints are necessary, and
“may not delegate the decision to shackle an inmate to the
marshals.”  Id.; see also Hameed v. Mann, 57 F.3d 217, 222 (2d
Cir. 1995) (same).  Thus, when a trial court delegates the
shackling decision to court security officers, “that is not an
exercise of discretion but an absence of and an abuse of
discretion.”  Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358.
Sides contends that the District Court impermissibly
delegated to the Deputy Marshal its authority to determine
whether (and what) physical restraints were necessary, and thus
necessarily abused its discretion.  We disagree.  Though the
Court adopted the Deputy Marshal’s advice, it nonetheless
acknowledged that the Marshal’s view was only a
recommendation and that the Court “could have the shackles
removed.”  See Hameed, 57 F.3d at 223 (“Though the court
plainly indicated that it relied heavily on the expertise of the
prison personnel, it also indicated that the ultimate decision was
that of the court.”).  Accordingly, this case is not similar to those
where a district court has no doubt delegated the shackling
decision to security personnel.  See Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1125
(district court stated that the decision on physical restraints was
“up to the officers” who accompanied the plaintiff, and that it
would not “do anything different than [what] they advise”);
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Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358 (district court left the decision on
physical restraints “entirely in the hands of the Department of
Corrections”).  
That said, it appears from the record we have that the
District Judge’s inquiry into the need for physical restraints was
limited to an ex parte communication with the Deputy Marshal.
We do not know, for example, whether the Deputy Marshal
disclosed to the Judge the basis for Sides’ designation as a
“category five security risk,” his placement in a “special needs
unit,” or the meaning of those classifications.  It is also
unclear—apart from the assertions of defendants’ counsel that
Sides had been a “very assaultive inmate” and had a “track
record of . . . misconduct[] and violence”—whether the Judge
inquired as to the particulars of Sides’ criminal history or prison
disciplinary record, and whether that history further suggested
that Sides posed a safety risk during court proceedings.  Cf.
Woods, 5 F.3d at 249 (magistrate judge did not abuse his
discretion by ordering inmates shackled during a civil trial
where the inmates “were undeniably dangerous as evidenced
from their criminal records[,] which include[d] two murders,
numerous armed robberies, rape and aggravated assault”).  To
the extent the District Judge chose to defer to the Deputy
Marshal’s recommendation, we believe he should have received
it on the record, thus allowing Sides an opportunity to challenge
the rationale for that recommendation. See Hameed, 57 F.3d at
223 (district court abused its discretion by, inter alia, relying on
ex parte communications from unidentified corrections officials
14
in determining that shackles were necessary).
It is also unclear on this record whether the District Judge
simply accepted the Deputy Marshal’s recommendation without,
as Sides urged, balancing the need for physical restraints against
the potential prejudice to him in determining whether, and to
what extent, physical restraints were required.  The Judge
plainly was concerned by the prejudicial effect of shackling
Sides during trial, and took measures to ameliorate that
prejudice.  However, he did not explain his reasons for
determining that the measures recommended by the Deputy
Marshal—handcuffs, leg irons, and having corrections officers
sit directly behind Sides throughout the trial—were “no greater
. . . than . . . necessary” to secure the courtroom.  Davidson, 44
F.3d at 1123; see also Woods, 5 F.3d at 248 (trial judge
approved the use of restraints for numerous reasons, including:
“(1) the poor design of the courtroom[,] [which] required
inmate-witnesses to travel through the courtroom in close
proximity to the bench, counsel tables and jury box to reach the
stand[;] (2) the number of inmate-witnesses (five) entering and
exiting the courtroom[;] [and] (3) the presence of only one court
security officer in the court”); Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358 n.4
(“‘Unless the district [court’s] discretion is to be absolute and
beyond review, the reasons for its exercise must be disclosed in
order that a reviewing court may determine if there was an abuse
of discretion.’”) (quoting United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610,
615 (4th Cir. 1970)).  On this record, we are unsure whether the
Court balanced the relevant interests before deciding that Sides
15
would be restrained, or considered whether the security
measures recommended by the Deputy Marshal were
collectively necessary (but not sufficient individually) to secure
the courtroom.  Cf. Lemons, 985 F.2d at 359 (“[A] determination
that some restraints are appropriate does not mean that leg-irons
and handcuffs are required.”). 
For example, it appears that even the Deputy Marshal did
not believe Sides posed such a security risk that it was necessary
he be restrained in handcuffs and leg irons at all times.  Indeed,
both the Deputy Marshal and the District Court agreed that it
was unnecessary for Sides to be shackled when he testified from
the witness stand, where he (presumably) was in far closer
proximity to the jury and the Judge than while seated at the
plaintiff’s table.
 Moreover, we are troubled that Sides testified while
wearing handcuffs and leg irons, despite the reminder of Sides’
counsel (shortly before Sides testified) to the Court of its prior
direction to dispense with shackling during his testimony.  In
that light, we stress that where a district court has found certain
preventive measures advisable to reduce the prejudice to a
prisoner-plaintiff who is restrained during trial, it should make
every effort to ensure that those measures are actually (and
consistently) applied. 
C. Harmless Error    
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We need not determine whether the District Court abused
its discretion here, however, as we conclude that any error was
harmless.  See, e.g., Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1124; Lemons, 985
F.2d at 359.  Several factors are relevant to this analysis,
including (1) “the strength of the case in favor of the prevailing
party,” Hameed, 57 F.3d at 222; (2) the “effect the restraints
may have had in light of the nature of the issues and the
evidence involved in the trial,” id.; see also Davidson, 44 F.3d
at 1124–25 (“Where the restraints would appear to be pertinent
to the substance of the plaintiff’s claims, the error may well not
be harmless.”); (3) whether measures were taken to prevent the
jury from viewing the restraints, Woods, 5 F.3d at 249; and (4)
whether the district court instructed the jury to disregard the
restraints in deciding the case, id.     
The officers argue that any error was harmless because
(1) Sides’ propensity for violence was not at issue, cf. Lemons,
985 F.2d at 357 (“Since plaintiff’s tendency towards violence
was at issue in this case, shackles inevitably prejudiced the
jury.”); and (2) the Court took preventive measures to conceal
the shackles.  
First, we cannot agree that Sides’ shackling was harmless
simply because his propensity for violence was not directly at
issue in the case.  In this regard, we find instructive the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Davidson, which
involved an inmate’s § 1983 action against various prison
officials for violating his right of access to the courts by reading
17
his legal mail.  44 F.3d at 1119.  In holding against harmless
error, the Second Circuit Court reasoned that though the
plaintiff’s claim did not “b[ear] a relationship to either a
propensity toward violence or a risk of escape, the potential for
prejudice nonetheless seem[ed] to have been significant, for the
verdict apparently was to turn on whether the jury would believe
[the plaintiff] and his prisoner-witnesses or the [Department of
Corrections’] witnesses.”  Id. at 1126 (appearing in shackles was
prejudicial to prisoner-plaintiff because the case came down to
a “‘swearing contest’ in which the credibility of the witnesses
was ‘crucial’”).  Similarly, the core issue in Sides’ case was
credibility—whether the jury would believe Sides or the
officers, who denied that the incident alleged by Sides had even
taken place.  In this context, we are unwilling to say that the
imposition of physical restraints cannot result in prejudice
simply because the plaintiff’s propensity for violence is not at
issue.
Yet the District Court took several appropriate steps to
conceal the shackles from the jury, including directing that (1)
a jacket be placed over Sides’ hands, (2) an apron and boxes be
placed around the plaintiff’s table, and (3) the jury be removed
from the courtroom before Sides took the witness stand (so as to
avoid jurors viewing Sides walk to the stand in leg irons).  As
Sides points out, these measures often were not effective—e.g.,
in some instances the jacket over his hands shifted, revealing his
handcuffs to anyone who was looking at him at that moment.
However, that these measures did not always conceal Sides’
18
shackles throughout trial does not compel the conclusion that he
was prejudiced.  Moreover, the limited instances where Sides’
shackles may have been exposed to the jury are dissimilar to the
more prejudicial circumstances of the cases on which he relies.
See Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1126 (prisoner-plaintiff appeared pro
se at trial, but the trial court “declined to modify its usual voir
dire procedure though that procedure forced [the plaintiff] to
hobble in leg-irons from [the] counsel table to the bench after
each round of questioning before he could make any objection
to any prospective juror”); Lemons, 985 F.2d at 356, 359
(prisoner plaintiff appeared in handcuffs and leg irons during
trial—including when he testified and “walk[ed before the jury]
to demonstrate his injuries”—but no “ameliorative steps were
taken” by the trial court).    
In addition, the District Court—apparently without
prompting by Sides’ counsel—gave a cautionary instruction to
the jury at the beginning of trial:
The Constitution does not stop at the prison walls.
All prisoners, including Mr. Sides, are afforded
the same protections under the United States
Constitution as you and I.
However, according to standard policy of
the Department of Corrections, Mr. Sides will be
secured while in the courtroom and accompanied
by uniformed officers here in the courtroom. 
      The parties did not address the District Court’s preliminary4
instructions in their briefs to us, and did not include those
instructions as part of the record on appeal.  We subsequently
asked the parties to supplement the record to include them.
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Again, this is a . . . standard procedure[] for all
inmates, and is not innate to Mr. Sides.  Such
procedures are always employed when any inmate
comes into the courtroom.  While these
circumstances are hard to ignore, you must keep
in mind that this is not something special, no
special thing we are doing for Mr. Sides.  It is
simply the standard procedure.
Also, during the course of the trial, other
inmates may testify.  These inmates will also be
secured and accompanied by uniformed officers.
Again, you are not to allow these standard
security measures to distract you from your job.
That is to decide the case based . . . solely on the
evidence.
We believe this instruction cured any prejudice to Sides.4
Not only did the Court direct the jury to disregard the restraints
and decide the case “based . . . solely on the evidence,” it sought
to dispel any assumption on the jury’s part that Sides was
restrained because he was a dangerous person (by instructing
that the restraints were “standard policy” for all inmates).  In
20
light of this cautionary instruction, we conclude that the
instances where Sides’ shackles were exposed—i.e., when he
moved his hands while sitting at the plaintiff’s table, and when
he testified—were not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.
See Woods, 5 F.3d at 249 (“taking steps to reduce the visibility
of restraints and the giving of limiting or curative instructions
dealing with the shackles are appropriate methods of eliminating
potential prejudice”); Holloway, 957 F.2d at 530 (“Any general
prejudice caused by the presence of the shackles was cured
when the district court admonished the jury to disregard the
shackles in their consideration of [the prisoner-plaintiff’s]
case.”).  
*    *    *    *    *
In closing, we stress (as other circuit courts have) that we
“do[] not endorse a general policy of parading inmate civil
plaintiffs or their witnesses before the jury in shackles.”
Holloway, 957 F.2d at 530.  We recognize, however, that district
courts have the weighty responsibility of ensuring the security
of their courtrooms, and endorse their broad discretion in
determining whether it is necessary to have a prisoner-party or
witness physically restrained during a civil trial.  So long as a
district court engages in an appropriate inquiry and supplies a
reasonable basis for its decision, we will defer to its
determination that physical restraints are necessary to ensure
courtroom security, as the trial judge is uniquely positioned and
qualified to make that determination.  
      In addition to his challenge to the physical restraints5
imposed during trial, Sides contends that the District Court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel the
production of a Department of Corrections procedures manual
without first reviewing the manual in camera.  However, as
Sides acknowledges, he did not request that the Court review the
manual in camera.  In any event, we conclude that the Court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel in light
of security concerns and instead ruling that neither side would
be permitted to refer to the manual during trial.  See Armstrong
v. Dwyer, 155 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 1998).    
21
In summary, before ordering a prisoner-party or witness
shackled at trial, district courts should hold a proceeding that
allows the parties to offer argument bearing on the need for
restraints as well as the extent of the restraints deemed necessary
(if any).  Where genuine and material factual disputes bearing
on these questions exist, courts need to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to resolve them.  They should weigh the need for
restraints against the potential for prejudice, and impose no
greater restraints than necessary to secure the courtroom.
Finally, courts should take all practical measures, including a
cautionary instruction, to minimize the prejudice resulting from
a party appearing in physical restraints.  
In this case, we conclude that, even if the District Court
erred in ordering that Sides be shackled during trial, that error
was harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm.   5
